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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
THE PROBLEM OF "MENTAL HARM"
IN THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
STEPHEN GOROVEt
One of the most significant issues that have been raised by
prominent American legal authorities in connection with the
Genocide1 Convention 2 centers around the concept of "mental
harm."3 What is meant by "mental harm" in the convention?
Can "mental anguish," "humiliation," "mental distress," discrim-
ination of any kind be considered to constitute "mental harm"?
Can the concept of "mental harm" be understood to mean the
"disintegration of the mind'" 4 or is it rather identical with "per-
manent physical injury to mental faculties"? What are the
necessary criteria, if any, of those acts which the Convention
intends to punish in connection with mental harm? Since there
seems to be no direct answer in the Convention to these very
important issues, the authorities go even further by raising the
question, how can the United States Senate give its consent to
the ratification6 of this Convention and undertake by it to punish
t Lecturer in Political Science and International Law, Albertus MagnusCollege.1. Genocide is a new term coined by Professor Raphael Lemkin from the
ancient Greek word genos meaning "race" or "tribe" and the Latin word
caedere meaning "to kill." See LEMxn, Axis RULE ix OCCUPiD EURorn
79 (1944). The word "genocide" could be translated literally as "race-mur-
der" but it is race-murder of a particular kind; it purports to describe the
crime of mass-annihilation of religious, racial, national and ethnical groups.
2. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations; see General Assembly, 3rd Session, Official Records, 178th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/PV 179, at 70 (Dec. 9, 1948). Up to October 14, 1950
the Convention had been ratified by more than 20 states and went into
effect on January 12, 1951 among the ratifying states. See U.N. BULL.,
Vol. IX, No. 9 478 (November 1, 1950). The U.S. has not ratified the Con-
vention as yet. For text of the Convention see U.N. Doc. A/PV 178 (Dec. 9,
1948).
3. Article II of the Convention reads: "... genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: . . . (b) causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group..." (Italics added.)
4. See Statement of E. Turlington, The Genocide Convention, Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 250 (1950).
5. See Resolution offered by the Section of International and Compar-
ative Law on the Genocide Convention to the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association (September 8, 1949), 35 A.B.A.J. 957 (1949).
6. On June 16, 1949 President Truman transmitted to the Senate of the
United States the Genocide Convention with a view to receiving the advice
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a crime, the meaning of which appears to be too elusive and
vague?
An inquiry into the fundamental issues relating to the con-
cept of mental harm and a comparison between this concept as
established by the Convention and somewhat similar notions of
"mental anguish, "grief," "humiliation," "mental distress," etc.,
-well-known through a number of American court decisions and
a series of international arbitral awards,-is of paramount im-
portance not only from the viewpoint of clarifying the intention
of the Contracting Parties, but also from the viewpoint of any
future judicial interpretation.
The problem of the concept of mental harm in the Genocide
Convention necessarily involves considerations of a divergent
nature. One part of these considerations is indispensably bound
up with the intention of the Contracting Parties, with all the pre-
liminary negotiations, arguments and counterarguments over
detailed matters relating to the concept of mental harm,-in
other words, with the whole spirit and objective of the Conven-
tion in which this intention is made manifest. An investigation
of these basic considerations which justified and made it neces-
sary for the Contracting Parties to include the concept of mental
harm in the Genocide Convention is the prerequisite of any study
which may involve the interpretation of this notion. The other
part of these considerations covers those vast fields of already
crystallized judicial and arbitral practices which, although in a
more perfect and developed system of law and in a different
sphere, have formulated seemingly similar concepts. An exami-
nation of these considerations is both necessary and useful for
the international jurist or judge, since it enables him to distin-
guish or draw analogy-as the case may be-between concepts
established and applied in different domains of the law.
The concept of genocide is defined in Article II of the Conven-
tion which enumerates five acts, the commission of any of which
is to constitute genocide, provided that it is committed with the
specific intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group as such in whole or in part.
These acts are:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
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(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
Since the entire phrasing of sub-paragraph (b) which touches
on the concept of mental harm is closely interrelated, it seems
advisable to compare the whole wording of this sub-paragraph
with the text of the Draft Convention7 as revised and adopted
by the Ad Hoc Committee.8 The corresponding text" of the
revised Draft Convention reads, "Impairing the physical integ-
rity of members of the group."10
Although there is no mention of mental harm in this sub-para-
graph, it should be noted that, in the course of the sessions of the
Ad Hoc Committee, the representative of China had already
called the attention of the Committee to the fact that during the
second World War the Japanese built a huge opium extraction
plant in Mukden, which could process some 400 tons of opium
annually, producing fifty tons of heroin-at least fifty times the
legitimate world requirements. This quantity, according to med-
ical authorities, would be enough to administer lethal doses to
from 200 to 400 million persons. 1 The representatives of China
pointed out that the Japanese had intended to commit and had
actually committed genocide by debauching the Chinese popula-
and consent of the Senate to ratification. See 21 DEP'T STATE BULL. 844(1949). In view of the Korean crisis he urged Senate approval of the Con-
vention. See 23 DEP'IT STATE BULL 379, 380 (1950).
7. U.N. Doc. E/794, at 13.
8. In accordance with the General Assembly's Resolution of December 11,
1946 in which the General Assembly affirmed that genocide is a crime under
international law the punishment of which is a matter of international con-
cern, the Economic and Social Council instructed in its resolution of
March 28, 1947 the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit a
draft convention on the crime of genocide. See Economic and Social Coun-
cil, 4th Sess. Resolutions, U.N. Doc. E/437, pp. 33-34. In pursuance of the
Economic and Social Council's Resolution the Secretariat, with the help of
experts in international and criminal law, prepared a Draft Convention
which was revised by an Ad Hoe Committee of the Economic and Social
Council. See Economic and Social Council, Summary Records of the Ad
Hoc Committe on Genocide, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.1-28 (Apr. 7- June 9,
1948).
9. Article II sub-paragraph (2) in the Ad Hoc Committe's Draft Con-
vention.
10. U.N. Doc. E/794, at 13.
11. U.N. Doc. E/794 at 15.
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tion with narcotics. He considered this to be the most sinister
and monstrous conspiracy known in history. He emphasized the
fact that narcotic drugs could be used as instruments of genocide,
and he wished it to be understood that Article II sub-paragraph
(2) would cover genocide by narcotics, if narcotic drugs were
not specifically mentioned in the Convention.12 Furthermore, he
suggested that sub-paragraph (2) should be amended to read,
"impairing the physical integrity or mental capacity of members
of the group," or "impairing the health of members of the
group." Such an amendment would make it certain that narcotic
drugs would be covered by the Convention.13
When the Draft Convention was discussed by the Sixth Com-
mittee of the General Assembly,14 the Chinese delegate submitted
similar amendments 1 referring to the crimes committed by
Japan against the Chinese race through the use of narcotics. He
pointed out that with the appearance of synthetic drugs the
potential results which could be envisaged would be even more
horrifying. One object of the Convention was to protect the
human race against that type of crime. The use of atomic
weapons was to be regulated by a special convention, and the
Commisssion on Narcotic Drugs had proposed 6 in a resolution
submitted to the Economic and Social Council, that the use of
narcotic drugs for such crimes should be covered by the Conven-
tion on genocide.'7
In course of the Eighty-first Meeting of the Sixth Committee
the Chinese delegate recalled's that his delegation had drawn the
Ad Hoc Committee's attention to the fact that Japan had com-
mitted numerous acts of genocide against the Chinese popu-
lation. 19 If those acts were not as spectacular as Hitlerite
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Official Records, Part I, Sixth Commit-
tee, Summary Records of Meetings (September 21- December 10, 1948).
15. Amendment to Article II of the Draft Convention, U.N. Doc.
A/C. 6/221 (October 6, 1948) : "Amend sub-paragraph (2) to read as fol-
lows: Impairing the physical or mental health of members of the group."
Cf. also U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/232.
16. Economic and Social Council, Third Year, 7th Sess. Official Records,
Supplement No. 9, Doc. E/799.
17. General Assembly, 3rd Sess. Official Records, Part I, Sixth Com-
mittee, Summary Records of Meetings (September 21-December 10, 1948),
69th Meeting pp. 59-60.
18. Id., 81st Meeting, at 175.
19. Economic and Social Council, Official Records, Third Year, 7th Sess.
Supplement No. 6, p. 6.
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killings in gas-chambers, their effect had been no less destructive.
In drawing up a convention of universal scope it was appropriate
to keep in mind not only the atrocities committed by Nazis and
fascists, but also the horrible crimes of which the Japanese had
been guilty in China.20 He could not share the view of the dele-
gates who felt that the text proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee
was adequate; he thought that the concept of impairing the
physical integrity was not broad enough to include the harm
done by the Japanese people through the use of narcotics. 21
The representative of the United Kingdom understood per-
fectly well the reasons which had prompted the Chinese delega-
tion to submit its amendment. He felt, however, that to introduce
into the Convention the notion of impairment of mental health
might give rise to some misunderstanding. He pointed out that
if such impairment produced repercussions on physical health
the case would be covered by the present text. If there were no
repercussions on physical health, it could not be said that a group
had been physically destroyed, that is to say, that the crime of
genocide had not been committed in the sense of Article II of the
Draft Convention.22
The arguments put forward by the delegate of Egypt were
along similar lines. He noted that the text submitted by the Ad
Hoc Committee met the demands of the Chinese delegation in the
light of previous understanding that the expression "physical
integrity" could be interpreted as implying mental integrity as
well. He thought that a clarification of that point should, there-
fore, be sufficient to satisfy the Chinese delegation. 23 Since the
Chinese delegation wished its amendment to stand, it was put to
vote but in the proposed form it was rejected.24 The United
States delegate had voted for the Chinese amendment on the
instruction of his delegation, although its view was that physical
integrity also included mental integrity. 25
At the same meeting the United Kingdom representative
pointed out that the wording of sub-paragraph (2) of the Draft
20. General Assembly, 3rd Sess. Official Records, Part I Sixth Com-
mittee, Summary Records of Meetings (September 21- December 10, 1948),
81st Meeting, p. 175.
21. Id. at 177.
22. Id. at 178.
23. Id. at 178.
24. Id. at 179.
25. Id. at 179.
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Convention was rather vague and proposed that it should be re-
placed by the following text: "Causing grievous bodily harm to
members of the group.121 He felt that it would not be appro-
priate to include in the list of acts of genocide, acts which were
of little importance in themselves and were not likely to lead to
physical destruction of the group.2 7 He also emphasized that in
proposing the addition of the word "grievous" his delegation
aimed to give greater clarity to the text, since that word had a
very precise meaning in English law.28 In fact, this was one of
the most important amendments, since it proposed adding the
word "grievous" to define the kind of physical integrity that was
to be affected.
The Indian representative agreed with the United Kingdom
delegate that the wording of sub-paragraph (2) was not clear.
As the United Kingdom representative was willing to delete the
word "grievous" in his amendment, if desired by the committee,
the Indian representative suggested that the basic idea of the
amendment could be retained if the word "serious" were in-
serted.2 On the whole he supported the United Kingdom amend-
ment but wished, in order to meet the desire of the Chinese dele-
gation, that the text submitted by the United Kingdom repre-
sentative should be amended by adding the words "or mental"
after the word "physical " 31, as indicated in his delegation's
amendment.-'
Finally, the Indian amendment altering the United Kingdom
proposal, i. e., that the words "or mental" should be inserted in
the United Kingdom amendment and that the word "grievous"
should be replaced by the word "serious" was adopted by 14
votes to 10, with 14 abstentions.32
From the preceding record of discussions and arguments of
representatives of the Contracting Parties in drawing up the
Genocide Convention, the precise intention of the Parties and the
basic considerations which led to the inclusion of the concept of
26. Id. at 175; see also U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/222.
27. Id. at 175.
28. Id. at 178.
29. Id. at 179.
30. Id. at 179.
31. U.N.Doc. A/C. 6/244.
32. General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Official Records, Part I, Sixth Com-
mittee, Summary Records of Meetings, 81st Meeting, p. 175 (September 21-
December 10, 1948).
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mental harm in the Convention can clearly be established. Those
who voted against the inclusion of mental harm did so, not be-
cause they had not considered acts seriously affecting mental
integrity of a given group as genocide, but because they thought
physical integrity also included mental integrity.33
The common law has long been reluctant to give general and
independent legal protection to one's peace of mind.3 4 "Mental
pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to
redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone,"
said Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight.5 This obviously re-
flects the notion that mental pain caused by a negligent act is
something too intangible and too elusive for the hardheaded
workaday common law to handle.3 6 The early cases in England"7
and in the United States38 denied recovery for injuries arising
out of fright occasioned by negligent acts of the defendant where
there was no physical "impact" concurrent with the fright. This
rule was soon repudiated in England3v but in the United States a
considerable minority of courts, following Lynch v. Knight, have
refused to permit recovery unless the mental pain was accom-
panied by contemporaneous impact" or was caused inten-
tionally4 or was the natural consequence of certain types of
breaches of contract.4 2 In general, recovery has been allowed for
33. Id. at 178.
34. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (1936). This reluctance has of course been more
pronounced where the defendant's conduct is merely negligent.
35. 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861).
36. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV.
497 (1922) ; Cf. also Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV.
260, 266 (1921), "The mere temporary emotion of fright not resulting from
in physical injury is, in contemplation of law, no injury at all, and hence
no foundation of an action."
37. Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222 (1888).
38. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897);
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Lehman
v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 47 Hun. 355 (N.Y. 1888).
39. Dulieu v. White 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
40. The majority of courts have allowed recovery for injuries sustained
through fright although the fright is unaccompanied by physical impact.
See Cashin v. Northern P. R. Co., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2nd 862 (1934);
Fraree v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935.
41. See Holdorf v. Holdorf, 185 Iowa 838, 169 N.W. 737 (1918), "The
rule ... denying liability for injuries resulting from fright caused by
negligence, where no physical injury is shown, cannot be invoked where it
is shown that the fright was due to a wilful act." See also Stiles v. Munic-
ipal Council of City of Lowell, 233 Mass. 174, 123 N. E. 615 (1919).
42. See I SEDGwicx, DAMAGEs § 45 (9th ed. 1912); HARPER, LAW OF
TORTS § 67 (1933); MCCoRMICK, DAmAGES §§ 88, 89 (1935).
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"mental suffering" by the courts, in cases of illegal arrest,43
assault,44 malicious prosecution,4 5 seduction, 46 and a number of
courts have permitted recovery against a telegraph company for
negligent transmission of messages, provided the defendant
knew or should have known the character of the message.
47
In all these decisions where legal protection is given to one's
mental integrity, the courts use a variety of terms. "Mental
anguish" is a high degree of mental suffering and not a mere
disappointment or regret.48 "Mental distress" includes sorrow
and grief.49 "Mental cruelty" is cruel treatment that produces
a degree of mental distress which threatens at least to impair the
health of the injured party.-- "Humiliation" and "mortification"
are simple phases of mental anguish.51 The general trend of re-
cent decisions 52 clearly shows that the courts have drifted pro-
gressively further and further away5 3 from the rule established
in the Mitchell case14 in the direction of a more liberal doctrine
affording protection to one's mental and emotional well-being.55
43 Young v. Gormley, 120 Iowa. 372, 94 N.W. 922 (1903).
44. McKinley v. C & N.W. R. Co., 44 Iowa 314 (1876).
45. Parkhurst v. Masteller, 57 Iowa 474, 10 N.W. 864 (1881).
46. Hawn v. Banghart, 76 Iowa 683, 39 N.W. 251 (1888).
47. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 145 (1935); PRossMR, TORTS 216 (1941).
48. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Cook, 30 S.W.2d 497, 499, 500
(Tex. 1930); Gerock v. Western Union Tel. Co., 147 N.C. 1, 7, 60 S.E. 637,
646 (1908). As to the ambiguity of the term "mental suffering" see I
SEDGWICK, DAMAGES § 43a (9th ed. 1912): "... mental suffering may consist
of annoyance, distress or anxiety. It may . . . become nervous shock or
nervous prostration .... Under the head of mental suffering come also
injuries to the feelings and affections - shame, humiliation, and grief."
49. Davis v. Hill 291 S.W. 681, 684 (Tex. 1927).
50. Eastman v. Eastman, 75 Tex. 473, 12 S.W. 1107 (1889).
51. Perkins v. Ogilvie, 148 Ky. 309, 314, 146 S.W. 735 (1912).
52. Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25
(1932) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. 269, 12 N.E.2d 360 (1938) ;
In Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 162 P.2d 133 (Ariz. 1945) it was held
that: ".... the mind of an individual, his feelings, and mental processes, are
as much a part of his person as his observable physical members. An
injury, therefore, which affects the sensibilities is equally an injury to the
person as an injury to the body would be." See also Emien v. Vike, 198
P.2d 696 (Cal. App. 1948).
53. Professor Hallen says in 19 VA. LAW REv. 271 (1933): "The older
negligence rule which denied recovery without impact now seems to have
become a minority doctrine and the courts which still adhere to that rule
are quick to find some slight impact, and permit recovery, although it seems
apparent that the injuries were caused by the fright and not by the
touch." Cf. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH.
L. REv. 497, 504 (1922): "The cases which do allow recovery for physical
injuries sustained through fright, negligently inflicted, even without
physical impact, seem emphatically right."
54. See note 38 supra.
55. Cf. Goodrich, supra note 53, at 513: "1... the law has already recog-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss2/2
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A brief examination of international arbitral awards likewise
indicates that International Arbitral Tribunals have followed
similar patterns. Umpire Parker in the Lusitani cases"0
discussed this subject at length. He said:
That one injured is, under the rules of international law,
entitled to be compensated for an injury inflicted resulting
in mental suffering, injury to his feelings, humiliation,
shame, degradation, loss of social position or injury to his
credit or to his reputation, there can be no doubt, and such
compensation should be commensurate to the injury."
Although it is difficult to lay down any rule for measuring
injury to the feelings, humiliation, shame or mental suffering,
nevertheless, these factors are generally taken into consideration
by International Tribunals in awarding compensatory damages.68
In a number of cases Arbitral Tribunals included in their
awards indemnity on account of "grave anxiety of mind,'
"mental suffering,"60 "grief,' ' 61 "shock,"62"indignity, ' 6o and the
like.
In all these decisions, however, no mention or reference can
nized the possession of a peaceful mental state as a subject for protection.
... That is the way the common law grows."
56. Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, established
under the agreement of August 10, 1922, DECISIONS AND OPINIONS (1925).
57. Id. at 27; Cf. GROTrUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS, translation of the
1646 ed., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (1925), bk. II,
ch. XVII sec. XII, p. 433: "... the one who is liable for an act is at the
same time liable for the consequences resulting from the force of the act."
58. Cf. I WHITEmAN, DAa'.AGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 627 (1937).
59. Shufeldt Claim (U.S. v. Guatemala), DEP'T STATE ARBITRATION
SER. 3, 881 (1932). See also the May Claim (U.S. v. Guatemala), 1900
FOR. REL. 648, 674.
60. Claim of Antoine Fabiani (France v. Venezuela) Ralston's Report
81 (1906). See also the Claim of Julia Groves Magill Lucas (U.S. v.
Mexico), Report to the Secretary of State, DEP'T STATE ARBITRATION SEn. 7,
305 (1940).
61. In the classical case of Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico)
Opinions of the Commissioners, 108, 118 (1927)1. damages were assessed
on the basis of the individual "grief" and indignity suffered by claimants.
62. In the claim of Lancaster W. Parmenter [(U.S. v. Mexico), Report
to the Secretary of State, DEP'T STATE ARBITRATION SER. 7, 223-224 (1940)],
it was held that though the claimant suffered no direct material loss in
consequence of the death of his son, the grief and "shock" incident to his
son's death, properly constitute a basis for an award. Cf. BORCHARD, THE
DIPLOIATIc PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 424 (1922).
63. See Teodoro Garcia (U.S. v. Mexico), Report to the Secretary of
State, DEP'T STATE ARBITRATION SER. 7, pp. 163, 169 (1940); Agnes
Connelly (U.S. v. Mexico), Id. at 159, 161 and Laura M. B. Janes et al.
(U.S. v. Mexico), Id. at 108, 118. Cf. the claim of Charles L. Stephens and
Bowman Stephens (U.S. v. Mexico), Id. at 397; BORCHARD, op. cit. supra
note 62, at 423.
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be found to the concept of "mental harm" as such. In fact, the
words "mental harm" do not seem to occur in any judicial or
arbitral decision, though court decisions reveal at least some
indications as to separate connotations of these terms. The word
"mental" in itself, describing the condition of a person, refers
to his senses, perceptions, consciousness and ideas.6 4 "Harm"
as the term is used in the Restatement of Torts5 is a loss or
detriment of any kind to a person resulting from any cause16 and
is often used in connection with "serious bodily harm!'67 to
describe a bodily harm the consequence of which is so grave or
serious 8 that it is regarded as differing in kind and not merely
in degree, from other bodily harm. A harm which creates a
substantial risk of fatal consequences is a "serious bodily
harm."61'
The problem with respect to these various and somewhat
similar terms presents itself when one compares or contrasts
them with the concept of "mental harm." The issue then arises
whether "mental harm" or more precisely "serious . . . mental
harm" can be interpreted to mean "mental anguish," "humilia-
tion," "mental distress," or can be contrasted with the concept
of "serious bodily harm" as referred to above. In other words,
how far can the process of analogy be applied in international
law, and what are the limits, if any, on resorting to subsidiary
sources for the purpose of interpreting international law?
Lauterpacht says in his excellent study on Private Law
Sources and Analogies of International Law:
The process of analogy is in the first instance a means of
interpreting and supplementing the law in accordance with
its own principles. That means that in resorting to analogy
for the purpose of interpreting and construing rules of
international law, we must so far as possible take into ac-
64. New York Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 588 (U.S. 1872).
65. II RESTATEMENT TORTS §§848, 902 (1939).
66. Cf. Lawler v. People, 74 Ill. 228, 231 (1874): "It is quite usual to
substitute 'injury' for 'harm' and nobody ever thought of questioning it."
67. The same words are used in Art. II sub-paragraph (b) of the
Genocide Convention and can be contrasted with the concept of "serious...
mental harm."
68. The word "serious" in itself appears in the court decisions. It means
"important," "weighty," "momentous and not trifling," in a grave manner,
so as to give ground for apprehension and being the equivalent of "great".
See Lawler v. People, 74 Ill. 228, 231 (1874); Ward v. State, 70 Tex. Cr.
R. 393, 159 S.W. 272, 282 (1913).
69. I RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 63 b (1934).
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count its actual rules and its spirit. Should, however, no
help be forthcoming from those sources, the recourse to a
subsidiary source is the proper way for an internationaljudge or jurist to choose70
In another passage7 1 he continues by asserting:
There is no need to resort to rules of an extraneous system
of law, so long as other avenues are open. For, international
law, deficient and undeveloped as it is in many respects,
constitutes nevertheless a system of law to which by neces-
sity the general rules and methods of scientific interpreta-
tion and construction resorted to in other systems of law
must apply.7 2
In Article 19 of the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties
prepared by the Research in International Law of the Harvard
Law School it is said:
A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general
purpose which it is intended to serve. The historical back-
ground of the treaty, travaux preparatoires, the circum-
stances of the parties at the time the treaty was entered
into, the change in these circumstances sought to be effected,
the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the pro-
visions of the treaty, and the conditions prevailing at the
time interpretation is being made, are to be considered in
connection with the general purpose which the treaty is
intended to serve.73
It is also equally well settled that in case of ambiguity or doubt
as to the meaning of the terms of a treaty it is appropriate to
look to the purpose of the instrument as a whole and to inquire
into the intention74 of the negotiators. For this purpose refer-
70. LAUTERPACHT, PRivATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 84 (1924).
71. Id. at 85.
72. Cf. GENY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOUuCES EN DROIT PRIvs
PosiTF 2nd. ed., 1919); VERDROSS, DIE VERFASSUNG DER VOLKERRECHTS-
GEMEINSOHAFT 69-75 (1926); I ANZILOTTI, CORSO Di DIRITTO INTER-
NAZIONALI_ 104 et seq. (1928); Ruegger; Privatrechtliche Begriffe im
Volkerrecht, 28 NIEIMEYERS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR INTERNATIONAI S RECHT 426-
502 (1920).
73. 29 Am. J. INT'L L., SuPP. 661 (1935). Cf. I OPPENHMIM, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 862 (Lauterpacht's ed. 1948).
74. Cf. McNAiR, LAW OF TREATIES 185 (1938): "The primary rule is
that the tribunal should seek to ascertain from all the available evidence
the intention of the parties in using the word or phrase being interpreted."
I WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed.) 293: "The important point
is to get at the real intention of the parties, and that enquiry is not to
be shackled by any rule of interpretation which may exist in a particular
national jurisprudence but is not generally accepted in the civilized world."
See also Ehrlich, L'interpretation des traites, 24 REU=nL DES COUS 116-
131 (1928); JOKL, DE L'INTEEPRETATION DES TRAITEs NoRmATwS D'APES
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ence is frequently made to the contemporary declarations made
by the parties during the course of the negotiations and at the
time of a signature, "not to make a treaty where the parties have
failed to do so, nor to change the terms of the treaty actually
made but to determine the general object of the negotiations,
the particular sense in which the terms, otherwise uncertain of
application, were used at the time, or the conditions as they
existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty."?5
It is in the light of these generally accepted rules of inter-
national law that the concept of mental harm has to be inter-
preted. It is clear that the Genocide Convention should be con-
sidered as a whole, and each of its parts in the light of all the
others. The general object and the whole spirit of the Conven-
tion which is brilliantly described in the Preamble thereof,76
and the prior negotiations and declarations leave no doubt as
to the intention of the Contracting Parties and as to the criteria
of those acts which the Convention intends to punish in connec-
tion with mental harm. 77
The record of the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee
makes it clear that the case that was specifically in mind was the
claim of the Chinese with reference to the dissemination by the
Japanese of opium drugs to the Chinese population. The indis-
pensable necessity for outlawing mass exterminations by nar-
cotics which were to serve the master-plan of genocide, was the
very reason which called for a special provision to cover any
LA DOCTRINE El' LA JURISPRUDENcE INTERNATIONALES 114-153 (1936);
FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc Tome I, Part 1, 64
(1922); RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
27 (1926); II HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1497 (1945); BRIERLY, THE LAW
OF NATIONS 234-235 (1949); GUGGENHErM, LEHRBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS
Bd. 1, 125-126 (1948); I SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 193-208(1945).
75. See CRANDALL, TREATiEs, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 377(2nd ed. 1916).
76. The Preamble of the Convention reads: "... Recognizing that at
all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and
being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious
scourge, international co-operation is required . . ."
77. See Statement of A. Fisher, The Genocide Convention, Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess. 263-264 (1950). "It is clear from the legis-
lative history of this language that what was meant was not just embar-
rassment or hurt feelings, or even the sense of outrage that comes from
such action as racial discrimination or segregation, however, horrible those
may be. What was meant was permanent impairment of mental faculty."
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future recurrence of these sorts"8 of crimes. Moreover, the sig-
nificance, in this respect, of the word "serious" in Article II
sub-paragraph (b) must not be overlooked.7 ) It is obviously
meant to be important, since it reaffirms the Parties' intention
that only acts with grave consequences can be considered as
falling within the scope of this provision.
Should, however, further specification be needed as to what
is meant by "serious mental harm," the answer could be easily
deduced by contrasting this notion with the concept of "serious
bodily harm," as described above. In the language of the Re-
statement "serious mental harm" would then be a mental harm,
the consequence of which is so grave or serious that it is
regarded as differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from
other mental harm. A mental harm which creates a substantial
risk of fatal consequences would be a "serious mental harm."' 80
Such an act, however, could only become a crime under the Geno-
cide Convention if coupled with the specific "intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group
as such."8'
The text of Article II reveals that the gist of the crime of
genocide lies in the requirement of this criminal intent, in the
absence of which an act of imposing intoxicants on a certain
group of people, or any other act which contains the necessary
78. The likely illustrations of this method of destruction are the use
of stupefying drugs and torture. The history of the last years, however,
has shown that there can be systematic and planned attempts to cause
the destruction or the disintegration of the human mind without the use
of drugs by psychological terror, by lack of sleep and the like. See State-
ment of A. Fisher, The Genocide Convention, Hearings, supra note 77,
at 263, 264. See also Statement of T. Dodd, id. at 255. Cf. LEMKIN, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 89 (1944).
The recent experiments by Paul Friedman on concentration camp psy-
chology in Cyprus show that the Nazi terror wrought an enormous dislo-
cation of spirit in the survivors of the camps. See, Friedman, The RoadBack for the D.P's, 6 COMMENTARY 505 (1948). Cf. Friedman, Some
Aspects of Concentration Camp Psychology, 105 Am. J. OF PSYCHIATRY
601-605 (1949), and Bettelheim, Individual and Mass Behaviour in ExtremeSituations, 38 JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 417-452
(1943).
79. The word "serious" refers both to bodily and mental harm.
80. Cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 63 (1935).
81. See Article II of the Convention. Raphael Lemkin, the originator
of the Genocide Convention, says in his monumental treatise, Axis RULE
IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 179 (1944): "It (genocide) is intended ... to signify
a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essen-
tial foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating
the groups themselves."
Washington University Open Scholarship
"MENTAL HARM" IN THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 187
criteria for the concept of "serious mental harm,"--"whatever
the degree of atrocity of the act might be and however similar it
might be to the acts described in the Convention-it could still
not be called genocide. -8 2
The foregoing array of considerations indicates some of the
answers to the basic objection that has been leveled against the
concept of mental harm with the implication that it is so broad a
term as virtually to make the crime of genocide incapable of defi-
nition and that its interpretation could be stretched to the ut-
most. 3 From what has been said it becomes quite clear that such
a criticism embodies an unfortunate misapprehension as to the
purpose of the Genocide Convention, and as to the generally
recognized rules of interpreting international law. 84
If the concept of "serious mental harm" is interpreted accord-
ing to and in the light of the Genocide Convention's clear and
essential principles, and if the deliberations of the Contracting
Parties and the final objective of the Convention are taken intb
consideration with due regard to the well-hallowed rules of
international law, there can be little doubt as to the meaning
and future scope of judicial application of this concept.
82. General Assembly, 3rd Session, Official Records, Part I, Sixth Com-
mittee, Summary Records of Meetings (September 21- December 10, 1948),
72nd Meeting, p. 87. Cf. Lemkin, The UN Genocide Convention, printed
as an Extension of Remarks of Representative Celler of New York in 95
CONG. REC. APP. A. 1224 (1949): "Where . . . specific intent is lacking
there is no genocide."
83. The arguments advanced by H. S. Bargar before the U. S. Senate
against the ratification of the Genocide Convention refer to this extreme
kind of interpretation by which "the doing of an act by an individual such
as the refusal of employment, or blackballing a person for membership
in a union or social club, or the publishing of any comment, no matter
how mild, with respect to any member of a minority, could be deemed by
the 'international penal tribunal' set up by this convention to constitute
'mental harm' and hence, under the clear provisions of the Genocide Con-
vention, to be worthy of punishment." See Statement of H. S. Bargar,
The Genocide Convention, Hearings, supra note 77 at 305.
84. Cf. Professor Myres S. McDougal's address at the forty-third annual
meeting of the American Society of International Law: "[Opposition to
the Convention] moves from a complete misconception of the conditions
under which we live today, a complete misunderstanding of the nature and
the role of international law, a complete misunderstanding of our consti-
tutional requirements and of the obligations imposed by the United Nations
Charter, and a tragic failure to consider what rational action calls for
under the conditions of the present time." See Proceedings 65 (1949).
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